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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 14-3951 
________________ 
 
THE WASHINGTON HOSPITAL, 
    Appellant 
 
 
v. 
 
SEIU HEALTHCARE INC. PENNSYLVANIA 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-13-cv-01607) 
 
District Judge:  Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr. 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 19, 2015 
 
Before:  FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR., SLOVITER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion filed: June 12, 2015) 
______________________ 
 
OPINION 
______________________
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Appellant the Washington Hospital (“the Hospital”) seeks to vacate an arbitration 
award pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 185 of the Labor Management Relations Act and 9 U.S.C. 
§ 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act.  Because the arbitrator’s decision “arguably 
constru[es]” the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”), see Oxford Health 
Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 (2013), we will affirm.1 
I. 
A.  
 We write primarily for the parties, and assume their familiarity with the text of the 
CBA and the arbitration proceedings.  Briefly, the Hospital and Appellee SEIU 
Healthcare Inc. Pennsylvania (“the Union”), a labor organization that represents the 
Hospital’s service and maintenance employees, are parties to the CBA.  The CBA 
contains a grievance procedure for the settlement of disputes, which culminates in 
binding arbitration.  Pursuant to the CBA, employees represented by the Union can be 
discharged and disciplined only for “just cause.”  App. at 273.  The CBA also contains a 
no-fault Absenteeism Policy, which provides in pertinent part: 
II. Definitions  
. . .  
. . . An occurrence is defined as one or more consecutive days in which an 
employee is absent from his or her scheduled work, inclusive of scheduled 
days off.  The first day that an employee calls off work counts as one (1) 
occurrence.  Any additional consecutive call offs will be assessed as a .5 
occurrence up to a total of 1.5. . . .  
. . .  
                                              
1 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 185 and 9 
U.S.C. § 10.  This court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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III. Progressive Discipline for Occurrences 
 
 Discipline under this system will begin if during any twelve (12) 
consecutive month period worked an employee has six (6) occurrences. . . .  
As has been the Hospital’s practice with all discipline, once an employee is 
disciplined he/she will continue to progress through the discipline steps 
unless he/she has had twelve (12) consecutive months worked without an 
occurrence that requires discipline.  Once an employee reaches a final 
written warning, any additional occurrence shall result in termination. 
 
 The date of any occurrence that results in discipline will be 
considered the disciplinary action date regardless of the date the discipline 
is actually administered. 
 
 A. Oral Warning – Six (6) but less than Eight (8) Occurrences. 
 B. Written Warning – Eight (8) but less than Nine (9) Occurrences. 
 C. Final Written Warning – Nine (9) but less than Ten (10)        
      Occurrences.  Note, any further occurrences, once an employee is 
      at the final written stage, shall result in suspension pending     
      discharge and/or termination. 
 D. Termination – Ten (10) or more Occurrences.  
 
Id. at 301-03.   
 Deborah Holden (“Holden”) was employed by the Hospital from April 1980 until 
her discharge on February 28, 2013.  Holden began accumulating occurrences under the 
Absenteeism Policy in November of 2011.  Between November 2011 and July 17, 2012, 
she accumulated a total of seven occurrences and received an Oral Warning on July 31, 
2012 that was effective July 17, 2012.  On March 1, 2013, Holden received a Written 
Warning effective February 22, 2013 for having reached 8.5 occurrences following her 
absences on February 21, 2013 and February 22, 2013.  Also on March 1, 2013, Holden 
received a notice of termination effective February 28, 2013 for absences occurring on 
February 26, 2013 and February 28, 2013, which brought her total number of occurrences 
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to ten.2  Holden was familiar with the Absenteeism Policy but was not aware that she had 
reached ten occurrences because she had not added them up.  At the time of these final 
two absences, she had a few vacation days remaining.  The Union filed a grievance on 
March 7, 2013 protesting Holden’s termination, and the matter proceeded to arbitration.   
 On June 28, 2013, the arbitrator held an evidentiary hearing, during which the 
parties submitted evidence, examined witnesses, and presented argument.  On October 9, 
2013, the arbitrator issued a decision concluding that the termination was improper.  He 
acknowledged that Holden had accumulated ten occurrences in a twelve-month period 
and was thus subject to termination.  However, he found that “all of the steps of the 
contractually agreed upon Progressive Discipline procedures were not followed.”  Id. at 
361.  Prior to the February 26, 2013 occurrence, Holden had accumulated 8.5 
occurrences, which warranted a Written Warning under the Policy, but “that Written 
Warning was not issued until March 1, 2013 which was after her termination.”   Id.  On 
February 26, 2013, Holden reached nine but less than ten occurrences, and, at that point, 
“the Policy required that she receive a Final Written Warning.”  Id.  Instead, the Hospital 
skipped over this step and issued a Termination Notice on March 1, 2013 because of her 
tenth occurrence on February 28, 2013.   
 The arbitrator recognized that the CBA makes “the effective date of the discipline 
the same as the date of the last occurrence, regardless of when the discipline was issued.”  
Id. at 362.  However, he found this irrelevant because he reasoned, “[w]hen dealing with 
                                              
2 Holden was not scheduled to work on February 27, 2013, so these were consecutive 
absences.  
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a no-fault attendance policy it is obviously very important for an employee to be 
accurately and promptly advised as to which stage of the disciplinary progression they 
are at in order to be better able avoid, if possible, additional absenteeism infractions and 
greater penalties.”  Id.  Noting Holden’s familiarity with the Policy and her thirty-three-
year employment with the Hospital, the arbitrator reasoned that, had Holden been issued 
a Written Warning or a Final Written Warning prior to her termination, she may have 
utilized her remaining vacation time to avoid termination.  Finally, as to the Hospital’s 
argument that its established practice was not to follow all of the progressive disciplinary 
steps, the arbitrator stated that this was “unpersuasive” because the purpose of these steps 
was to warn the employee and provide a chance for corrective action—a chance which 
Holden was denied.  Id. at 363.   
 The arbitrator concluded that Holden’s termination was improper and that she was 
entitled to reinstatement.  However, because Holden, in failing to seek other employment, 
did not attempt to mitigate her losses, she was not entitled to back pay.3  On October 28, 
2013, the Hospital filed a motion with the arbitrator to open the record and/or for 
reconsideration.   The arbitrator denied the motion on November 5, 2013.  
B. 
 On November 7, 2013, the Hospital filed a complaint and a motion to vacate the 
arbitration award with the District Court.  The Hospital asserted that the arbitrator’s 
award “exceeds his powers, is unreasonable, is irrational, does not draw its essence from 
                                              
3 On October 23, 2013, the arbitrator filed a Corrected Award, which did not alter the 
award in any way that is material to this appeal.   
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the parties’ CBA and is unsupported by the record, the established past practice of the 
parties, or applicable case law and statute.”  Id. at 21.  The Union answered and 
counterclaimed to enforce the award on January 5, 2014.   
 On March 6, 2014, the parties filed a report pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(f) (“Rule 26(f) Report”), which reflected their agreement “that there is no 
need for fact discovery based on the issues presented.”  Id. at 390.  On March 20, 2014, 
the Hospital filed a motion for leave to amend the Rule 26(f) Report to include time for 
discovery and for amendment of the complaint.  The basis of the motion was the 
Hospital’s finding, after the filing of the Rule 26(f) Report, that Holden had applied for 
Social Security Disability benefits during the arbitration, “was declared disabled by the 
Social Security Administration as of March 1, 2013[,] and was awarded disability 
benefits as of August 2013.”  Id. at 397.  The Hospital requested discovery “to determine 
if Ms. Holden committed fraud through her testimony at the Arbitration Hearing and, as 
such, her testimony should be disregarded” and her grievance rendered moot.  Id.  
Holden’s June 28, 2013 testimony elicited on cross-examination by the Hospital, which 
the Hospital now claims was fraudulent, is as follows: 
Q: Now, are you presently working? 
A: No, I’m not. 
Q: Is there a reason you’re not working at the present time? 
A: I am currently collecting unemployment and I am looking for other 
employment.  I just have not found the right job. 
Q: You’re not representing that you’re incapable of working? 
A. No, I am not. 
. . . 
Q: Have you made applications to any health care facilities for work? 
A: No, I have not.  I have been going on the job search for LPN position, 
because I have a license.  I have looked at them, and currently I can’t go per 
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se to an interview, because my vehicle is down, has been down since I have 
been terminated. . . . 
 
Id. at 204-05. 
 The Union opposed the motion to amend the Rule 26(f) Report, and on August 20, 
2014, the District Court denied the Hospital’s motion to vacate the arbitration award and 
its motion to amend the Rule 26(f) Report.  As to Holden’s testimony and her claim for 
disability benefits, the Court stated, “Ms. Holden was not asked any questions about a 
social security disability claim, nor did she volunteer any information along these lines.  
Thus, she cannot be said to have lied in her testimony.”  Id. at 6.  Moreover, the Court did 
not believe the “issue [was] relevant to the Arbitrator’s decision which was based on his 
assigned task to interpret the CBA terms.”  Id.  As to the issue of whether the Arbitrator 
failed to draw the decision from the CBA, the Court determined that the decision came 
not only from the essence of the contract but “from the literal words of the contract 
itself.”  Id. at 7-8.  The Hospital filed a timely notice of appeal.   
II. 
A. 
 We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s decision on a motion to 
vacate an arbitration award.  Akers Nat’l Roll Co. v. United Steel, Paper & Forestry, 
Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l Union, 712 F.3d 155, 160 (3d 
Cir. 2013).  We apply the same narrow review the District Court should have applied.  Id.  
“If an ‘arbitrator’s award draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement, and 
is not merely his own brand of industrial justice, the award is legitimate.’”  Id. (quoting 
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United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987)).  We 
review the District Court’s ruling on the motion to amend the Rule 26(f) Report to permit 
discovery for abuse of discretion.  Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 
(3d Cir. 1987).   
B. 
 The Hospital argues that the District Court abused its discretion by denying the 
Hospital’s request for discovery and by dismissing the action.  According to the Hospital, 
to be deemed totally disabled by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”), a person 
must show that he or she “cannot do the work [he or she] did before; a medical condition 
prevents the individual from adjusting to other work; and the disability is expected to last 
at least one year or result in death.”  Appellant’s Br. at 19.  But at the evidentiary hearing, 
Holden testified that she was capable of working, which “contradicts her representation 
to the SSA” that she was “permanently disabled and unable to work.”  Id.  Holden’s 
testimony at the arbitration hearing was—in the Hospital’s view—fraudulent; thus, the 
Hospital argues that the award was procured by fraud and is subject to vacatur pursuant 
to 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1).4  Moreover, because Holden was retroactively deemed disabled as 
of the date of her termination, the Hospital argues that “the Union lacked [Article III] 
standing to bring a claim on behalf of her for reinstatement under the CBA.”  Id. at 21-23.  
We disagree. 
                                              
4 This was not the basis for which the Hospital sought vacatur in its complaint, but the 
Hospital anticipated amending its complaint following discovery.   
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 We conclude that Holden’s testimony was not fraudulent, and that even if it was, it 
was immaterial to the purpose of the arbitration, which was to obtain an interpretation of 
the CBA.  At the time of her testimony, Holden had not been declared disabled; in fact 
she was collecting unemployment benefits.  Any inconsistency between Holden’s seeking 
disability benefits while elsewhere stating that she was able to work is an issue for 
consideration by the SSA and the State of Pennsylvania in determining which type of 
government benefits she can collect.  In reviewing an arbitration award, we will not 
penalize Holden who, upon finding herself unemployed, sought alternative types of 
government benefits, the requirements for the receipt of which are conflicting.  And 
notably, Holden was not directly asked if she had applied for disability benefits.   
 Moreover, Holden’s testimony was irrelevant to the arbitrator’s determination that 
the Hospital breached the CBA.  The Hospital has pointed to no authority or language 
from the CBA suggesting that Holden must be eligible for reinstatement in order to 
proceed with arbitration.  The arbitration is governed by the text of the CBA, which 
defines grievance as “any question or controversy between the Hospital and one or more 
employees of the Union, as to the interpretations, or application of, or compliance with 
the terms of this Agreement only.”  App. at 264.   Under this definition, the parties had a 
live grievance at the time of the arbitration hearing and decision in that they disagreed 
over the interpretation of the Absenteeism Policy as it was applied to Holden.  Whether 
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there would be a remedy for Holden does not negate the Union’s interest in obtaining the 
arbitrator’s interpretation for the benefit of all the employees that the Union represents.5    
 For these reasons, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by its denial of the 
discovery request or its determination that Holden’s testimony was not fraudulent or, 
alternatively, was irrelevant to the issues decided by the arbitrator. 
C. 
 The Hospital also seeks to vacate the arbitrator’s decision and award pursuant to 9 
U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act, which provides that a district court may 
vacate an arbitration award “where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so 
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject 
matter submitted was not made.”  The Hospital’s burden to demonstrate this error is 
“heavy.”  Oxford Health Plans LLC, 133 S. Ct. at 2068.  The question for our review is 
“whether the arbitrator (even arguably) interpreted the [CBA], not whether he got its 
meaning right or wrong.”  Id.    
 We conclude that the arbitrator’s decision and award “arguably construes” the 
CBA and that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority.  The arbitrator discussed the no-
fault Absenteeism Policy at length, including its operation and purpose.  He referenced 
the Policy’s detailed disciplinary steps and explained how the Hospital failed to follow 
the final two warning steps before termination.  The arbitrator acknowledged the 
                                              
5 While the arbitrator’s interpretation of the CBA and finding of a breach are not 
undermined by Holden’s alleged fraud, the receipt of SSA disability benefits may have 
implications on future enforcement of the arbitrator’s award.   
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Hospital’s argument that the CBA makes the discipline’s effective date the same day of 
the last occurrence, but he found that this did not negate the need for timely, meaningful 
warnings to achieve the Absenteeism Policy’s goal of providing the employee with 
opportunity “to avoid, if possible, additional absenteeism infractions and greater 
penalties.”  App. at 361-62.  Furthermore, the Policy references “progress[ing] through 
the discipline steps” and states that “[t]he Disciplinary Action sends a message to the 
employee that immediate improvement in attendance is required.”  Id. at 302.   Thus, the 
arbitrator’s interpretation is consistent with the text of the CBA.  It cannot be seriously 
disputed that the arbitrator was “arguably construing” the CBA, and thus, we will uphold 
the arbitration decision. 
III. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court.  
 
